Corrupción y confianza en México: el caso de las palancas (pp. 66-79; DOI: 10.23692/iMex.20.5)

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Dr. David Arellano-Gault

Professor Arellano-Gault is Ph.D. in Public Administration, University of Colorado. Full Professor at the Public Administration Department, CIDE Mexico City. He is member of the Mexican Academy of Science and also member of the Mexican National Researcher System. David publishes his research in academic journals both in Mexico and abroad. He has been editor or member of editorial boards in journals like Gestión y Política Pública, Organization Studies, Public Administration Review, and Governance. His most recent book has been published by Routledge, Corruption in Latin America (2020) and deals with corruption as a “dense social relation” with deep organizational roots.

Mtro. Luis Jair Trejo Alonso

Luis Jair holds a master’s in Public Administration and Public Policy by CIDE (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics), Mexico City, where he also served as assistant professor. Currently he works at FLACSO (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences), a research center in Mexico City, as head of the planning department. His research topics deal with policy analysis, particularly in the fields of education and corruption. Some of his most recent publications are:  Arellano-Gault, D. & Trejo, L.J. (2019) “Palanca-lever (Mexico)” In the Global Informality Project. Alena Ledeneva (Ed.) University Collage London (available at: https://bit.ly/2CgLGNp) and Arellano-Gault D. & Trejo, L.J. (2017). “De la corrupción de individuos a la corrupción sistémica: las aportaciones de la antropología y sus lecciones organizacionales” (From corruption of individuals to systemic corruption: the anthropological view and the lessons for organizational studies), in Administración Pública y Sociedad (Public Administration & Society). (book). Julio César Olvera & Leticia Contreras (eds). UAEM, Toluca, Mexico.

 

What happens when a country does not endorse its government with an elementary level of confidence? One possible answer is that the society of such a country is perfectly capable of assembling other more particular logics of trust: one that is based not on universal formal values but on particular specific relationships among families, friendship or networks of acquaintances.

As Putnam (2016) has explained about social capital, trust can also build social interrelations through contradictory logics. Contradictory with formal rules or procedures, but nevertheless effective and functional at societal day to day level. Indeed, multiple examples of practices based on trust such as the so-called “exchange of favors” have been studied in diverse societies (Ledeneva 2018). In Mexico there is such a widespread practice: it is called “levers”. And in the Mexican case, as in many other countries in Latin America, levers are useful to circumvent, above all, formal rules that come from government regulations and laws. Levers, as a particularistic logic of trust, is a rich relationship and can be become sophisticated in its dynamics: it requires rules of engagement, communicational skills, rules of etiquette, and even its sustained throughout its own codes of ethics. The (vicious?) cycle is clear: these particularistic practices flourish because the government is not trusted to act impartially and effectively. Through the levers case study, this article studies the logic of reproduction of particularistic forms of trust, linking Mexican levers with their possible role in the widespread corruption suffered in the country. This link suggests that, if the levers require trust, corruption in the country is often based on some logic of trust as well. The socially dense phenomenon of the lever may be an interesting helpful explanatory element for the persistence of corruption in Mexico.

¿Qué sucede cuando una sociedad no tiene un nivel elemental de confianza en su gobierno? Una posible respuesta es que la sociedad es perfectamente capaz de crear otras lógicas de confianza más particulares entre sus miembros más o menos organizados a través de grupos, por ejemplo.

Como Putnam (2016) ha explicado con respecto al capital social, la confianza también puede construir interrelaciones sociales con lógicas sociales cerradas, contradictorias y paradójicas. En efecto, múltiples ejemplos de prácticas basadas en la confianza, como el denominado “intercambio de favores”, han sido estudiadas en las más diversas sociedades en desarrollo. En México, las palancas son un ejemplo de este tipo de relaciones de intercambio. En el caso mexicano, como en el de muchos países, las palancas son útiles para circunvenir, sobre todo, reglas formales que vienen de las regulaciones y actores gubernamentales. Esta lógica particularista de confianza es rica y puede ser muy sofisticada en su dinámica: requiere reglas de compromiso, habilidades comunicativas, reglas de etiqueta e incluso sus propios códigos de ética. El círculo (¿vicioso?) es claro: estas prácticas florecen porque no se confía en que el gobierno actúe de manera imparcial y eficaz. A través del caso de estudio de palancas, este documento estudia la lógica de reproducción de formas particularistas de confianza, vinculando palancas con su posible papel en la corrupción generalizada que se sufre en México. Este vínculo plantea que, si las palancas requieren confianza, su derivación en lógicas de corrupción también. El fenómeno denso socialmente de la palanca puede ser un explicativo interesante de la perseverancia de la corrupción en México.